Monetary policy and the adjustment to country-specific shocks by Margarida Duarte





he question of the optimal degree of exchange rate variability among
countrieshasbeenlongstandingininternationaleconomics. Friedman
(1953)arguedinfavorofﬂexibleexchangerates: whennominalgoods
prices are sticky, the adjustment of the nominal exchange rate allows for the
necessaryrelativepriceadjustmenttoacountry-speciﬁcshock. Recentarticles
byDevereuxandEngel(2003)andCorsettiandPesenti(2001),however,show
that the optimal degree of exchange rate variability between two countries
subject to country-speciﬁc real shocks depends critically on the nature of
price stickiness, in particular, whether prices are sticky in the currency of the
producer or in the currency of the buyer.
When prices are preset in the currency of the buyer, unanticipated move-
ments in the nominal exchange rate do not affect the price of imported goods
on impact. That is, as suggested by the empirical evidence, the pass-through
of exchange rate changes to consumer prices in the short run is low.1 The
ﬁndings in Devereux and Engel (2003) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) show
thatwhenpricesarepresetinthecurrencyofthebuyer(and, therefore, assug-
gestedbythedata,donotrespondtomovementsintheexchangerate),optimal
monetary policy implies that the nominal exchange rate does not respond to
country-speciﬁc shocks.2 This ﬁnding is in sharp contrast with Friedman’s
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1 Recent empirical studies have documented a low pass-through of changes in the exchange
rate to consumer prices: in the short run, consumer prices respond little to changes in the nominal
exchange rate. See, for example, Engel (1993, 1999) and Engel and Rogers (1996), among others.
2 If, instead, prices are sticky in the currency of the producer, then consumer prices of im-
ported goods change proportionally with unanticipated changes in the nominal exchange rate (com-
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(1953) argument in favor of nominal exchange rate ﬂexibility in the presence
of nominal price rigidities and country-speciﬁc shocks.
InthisarticleIstudyoptimalmonetarypolicyinatwo-countrymodelthat
features nontraded goods and in which producers in each country set prices
one period in advance in the currency of the buyer. The article shows that
the presence of nontraded goods has important implications for the optimal
degree of nominal exchange rate variability in response to country-speciﬁc
shocks.
When all goods are traded, I ﬁnd that, as in Devereux and Engel (2003)
andCorsettiandPesenti(2001),bothmonetaryauthoritiesrespondinthesame
manner to country-speciﬁc shocks. In the absence of nontraded goods, home
and foreign agents consume the same basket of traded goods, and the nominal
exchange rate does not move in response to country-speciﬁc shocks when
countries follow their optimal monetary rules. As a consequence, a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime can be supported by optimal monetary policies. An
important feature of the model when all goods are traded is that it implies that
therearenorelativepricedifferentialsacrosscountriesunderaﬁxedexchange
rate regime. There exists, however, evidence of such price differentials across
countries that participate in a currency union (and, therefore, have a constant
nominal exchange rate). Duarte (2003), for example, documents inﬂation
differentials among member countries of the European Monetary Union as
big as 4 percentage points.
When a set of consumption goods is nontraded and the consumption bas-
ket is distinct across countries, I show that the model is consistent with the
observed relative price differentials across countries under a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime. I ﬁnd, however, that in this situation a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
is not supported by optimal monetary policies since the monetary authorities
choose to respond differently to country-speciﬁc shocks. That is, a ﬂexible
exchange rate regime is supported by optimal monetary policies when the
model is consistent with two observations—that of relative price differentials
acrosscountriesunderaﬁxedexchangerateregime, aswellastheobservation
of low pass-through of exchange rate changes to consumer prices.
Thepresenceofnontradedgoodshasbeenshowntohaveimportantimpli-
cations in open-economy models in dimensions other than the optimal degree
of exchange rate variability. Stockman and Tesar (1995) show that nontraded
goods play an important role in accounting for the properties of the interna-
tional business cycle of industrialized countries. More recently, Corsetti and
Dedola (2002) and Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003) show that nontraded
goods, used in the distribution sector, play an important role in explaining ob-
plete exchange rate pass-through). In this case, Devereux and Engel (2003) and Corsetti and Pesenti
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served deviations from the law of one price and low pass-through of exchange
rate changes to consumer prices.
In Section 1, I present a two-country model in which agents consume
traded and nontraded goods and in which prices are sticky. In the following
section,Istudytheimplicationsofthepresenceofnontradedgoodsforrelative
price differentials across countries under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime and for
theoptimalresponseofamonetaryauthorityseekingtomaximizetheexpected
utility of the representative agent in the country.
1. THE MODEL
InthissectionIdevelopageneralequilibriummodelofaworldeconomywith
two countries, denominated home and foreign, which builds upon the work of
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). Both countries are populated by a continuum of
monopolistic producers, indexed by i ∈ [0,1] in the home country and i∗ ∈
[0,1] in the foreign country. Each agent produces two goods, a differentiated
tradedgoodandadifferentiatednontradedgood.3 Agentsconsumeallvarieties
ofhomeandforeign-tradedgoodsandallvarietiesofthelocal-nontradedgood.
In each country there is a monetary authority that prints local currency and
distributes it to the individual agents through lump sum transfers.
I now describe the home economy. The foreign economy is analogous to
the home economy. Foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk.
Preferences
All agents have identical preferences deﬁned over a consumption index, real
money balances, and work effort. To keep the algebra to a minimum, the
lifetime expected utility of a typical home agent j is deﬁned as
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1−γ , (2)
where cT,t(j) denotes the agent’s consumption index of traded goods and
cN,t (j) denotes the agent’s consumption index of nontraded goods. The con-
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1−η , (3)
3 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, 661) for a discussion of the environment where individuals,
instead of ﬁrms, are the locus of monopoly power.24 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
where cH,t (j) and cF,t (j) denote agent j’s consumption index of home
and foreign-traded goods, respectively.4 Finally, the consumption indexes
of home-traded goods, cH,t (j), foreign-traded goods, cF,t (j), and local-
nontraded goods, cN,t (j), are each deﬁned over consumption of all the vari-
eties of each good, as
cH,t (j) =




























h, h ∈ [0,1], at date t. The terms ct (f,j) and ct (n,j) in equations (5) and
(6) have analogous interpretations.
Note that in equations (2) and (3) it is assumed that the elasticity of
substitutionbetweenthecompositegoodsofhomeandforeign-tradedvarieties
(cH (j) and cF (j)) and the elasticity of substitution between the composite
goods of traded and nontraded varieties (cT (j) and cN (j)) are equal to one.
In expressions (4) through (6), however, the elasticity of substitution between
distinct varieties of a given good (nontraded or traded) is given by θ, which is
assumed to be greater than one.5
Let’sdenotebyPH,t (h)andPF,t (f)thehome-currencypricesofvarieties
h and f of the home and foreign-traded goods at date t, respectively. And let
PN,t (n) denote the home-currency price of variety n of the local-nontraded






where the price of one unit of the composite good of all traded varieties, PT,t,
and the price of one unit of the composite good of nontraded varieties, PN,t,
4 I follow Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Devereux and Engel (2003) in assuming that foreign









is, home and foreign agents consume the same basket of home- and foreign-traded goods. This
specﬁcation, for example, does not generate home bias.
5 This assumption is required to ensure that an interior equilibrium with a positive level of
output exists.
6 The price index Pt is deﬁned as the minimum expenditure required to buy one unit of
the composite good ct, given the prices of all individual varieties. The other price indexes have
analogous interpretations. See the appendix for the derivation of the price indexes and the demand
















The prices of one unit of the composite goods of home and foreign-traded
varieties, in turn, are given by
PH,t =














For the above speciﬁcation of consumption indexes, agent j’s demands
for variety h and f of home and foreign-traded goods are given by















The agent’s demand for variety n of the nontraded good is given by








The home agent j operates two technologies, one to produce a variety h of the
home-traded good and the other to produce a variety n of the nontraded good.
Bothtechnologiesarelinearinlabor. Thecorrespondingresourceconstraints,

















where zt denotes a country-speciﬁc productivity shock to both nontraded and
traded technologies.7 The term
  1
0 ct (h,i)di represents aggregate demand
7 This article concerns the adjustment to country-speciﬁc shocks, and, therefore, I abstract
from sector-speciﬁc shocks.26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
in the home country for home variety h. The other integrals have analogous
interpretations. The terms lT,t(j) and lN,t (j) denote the fraction of time
that agent j allocates to production of the traded and nontraded varieties,
respectively.The agent’s total work effort, lt (j), is given by lT,t(j)+lN,t (j).
Budget Constraint
Agent j holds local currency, Mt (j), and trades state-contingent nominal
bonds (denominated in the home currency) with foreign agents. We denote
the price at date t when the state of the world is st of a bond paying one unit
of currency at date t + 1 if the state of the world is st+1 by Qst+1|st, and we
denote the number of these bonds purchased by the home agent at date t by
Bst+1 (j). Bond revenues received at date t when the state of the world is st
are denoted by Bst (j).




Qst+1|stBst+1 (j) + Mt (j) (16)
≤ Rt (j) + Bst (j) + Mt−1 (j) + Tt (j),
where Ptct (j) is nominal expenditure in consumption, Rt (j) denotes sales
revenues, and Tt (j) denotes lump sum transfers received from the monetary
authority.
Revenues from selling the traded variety h and the nontraded variety n,
Rt (j), are given by
Rt (j) = PH,t (h)
  1
0













In this expression, P ∗
H,t (h) denotes the foreign currency price of home-traded




t (h,i∗)di∗ denotes agent j’s sales revenue in the
foreign country (expressed in foreign currency units). The nominal exchange
rate in period t, denoted by et, converts foreign currency sales revenue into
home-currency units.
TheAgent’s Problem
Agent j maximizes his expected lifetime utility (equation (1)) subject to the
resource constraints for the home-traded variety h and nontraded variety n he
produces (equations (14) and (15)) and his budget constraint (equation (16)),
by choosing sequences of consumption, bond holdings, money holdings, and
prices for the varieties h and n, taking other prices as given.M. Duarte: Monetary Policy and Country-Speciﬁc Shocks 27
I assume that agents choose the nominal price of their traded and non-
traded varieties one period in advance.8 Moreover, I assume that producers
can segment home and foreign markets and set prices for the traded variety in
the currency of the buyer. Then, home producer j producing home-traded va-
riety h and nontraded variety n chooses prices PH,t (h), P ∗
H,t (h), and PN,t (n)
(where P ∗
H,t (h) is denominated in foreign currency units) at time t −1, taking
other prices as given. The agent’s problem is solved inAppendixA.







ity of the (representative) agent’s marginal wealth. The ﬁrst-order condition

















Finally, from the ﬁrst-order conditions for state-contingent bond holdings
for home and foreign agents, we obtain the risk sharing condition9
Ptct = etP ∗
t c∗
t . (20)
For the momentary utility speciﬁcation in equation (1), complete risk shar-
ing implies that nominal expenditure in consumption (when expressed in the
same currency) is equalized across countries. Note that consumption of the
compositegooddiffersacrossthetwocountriesonlytotheextentthatitsprice
(when expressed in the same currency) differs across countries, that is, when
there are deviations from purchasing power parity (or Pt  = etP ∗
t ).
In a symmetric equilibrium, the optimal pricing equations are




















8As in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Devereux and Engel (2003), I abstract from a richer
price adjustment setting in order to simplify the analytical solution of the model.
9 Several recent articles have assumed complete nominal asset markets. See, for example,
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2003) or Devereux and Engel (2003) for a discussion.28 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
and
PN,t (n) = PN,t = PH,t (h). (23)
Sincepricesaresetinadvanceinthecurrencyofthebuyer, itfollowsthat,
in the event of an unanticipated shock, consumer prices remain unchanged
for one period. On impact, therefore, there is no pass-through of nominal
exchange rate movements to consumer prices, and unanticipated changes in
the nominal exchange rate cause ex-post deviations from the law of one price
(that is, PH,t (h)  = etP ∗
H,t (h)).
If, instead, agents choose prices after observing the current realization
of productivity shocks, then the price rules above hold in each state of the
world and not just in expectation. Note that with ﬂexible prices, PH,t (h) =
etP ∗
H,t (h) holds every period (i.e., the law of one price holds). That is, even
though ﬁrms can segment home and foreign markets, they optimally choose
to charge the same price (when denominated in the same currency) in both
markets when prices are ﬂexible.
MonetaryAuthority
The monetary authority prints money and rebates the seigniorage revenue to
agents through lump sum transfers. Its budget constraint is
  1
0





supplies the amount of nominal money balances demanded. I follow Corsetti
and Pesenti (2001) in characterizing monetary policy in each country by the
reciprocal of the marginal utility of the representative agent’s nominal wealth,
µ ≡ 1
λ. In equilibrium, the marginal utility of wealth is given by equation















, an expansionary monetary
policyshock(higherµt andhighernominalexpenditurePtct inequilibrium)is
associatedwithalowernominalinterestrateit+1 and,therefore(fromequation
(18)), with higher money balances demanded.
The Solution of the Model
The solution of the model can be easily obtained in closed form by expressing
all endogenous variables as functions of real shocks (zt and z∗
t ) and monetary
stances (µt and µ∗
t ). The solution of the model is derived inAppendix B.M. Duarte: Monetary Policy and Country-Speciﬁc Shocks 29


















































Note that consumption in the home country is independent of (contempo-
raneous) changes in the nominal exchange rate when prices are preset in the
buyer’s currency. Therefore, consumption in the home country is not affected
by foreign monetary policy, µ∗
t . Note also that, for given µt and µ∗
t , real
shocks do not have a contemporaneous impact on consumption (and, there-
fore,output),onlyaffectinglaboreffortinthecountrywheretheshockoccurs.
In response to a positive productivity shock in the home country, home agents
produce the same quantity of traded and nontraded goods with less hours of
work.
It is also useful to characterize total consumption and labor allocations
when prices are ﬂexible. In this case, total consumption and total labor effort


















With ﬂexible prices, total consumption depends only on real shocks and is
independentofmonetarypolicy. Inresponsetoapositiveproductivityshockin
the home country, total consumption increases more in the home country than
in the foreign country. Since this shock affects total consumption differently
in the two countries, it is associated with an equilibrium real interest rate
differentialacrossthetwocountries. Notealsothat,sinceforeign-tradedgoods
become relatively more expensive than home goods (traded and nontraded),
agents substitute consumption toward goods produced in the home country30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
and away from goods produced in the foreign country.10 Labor effort in each
sector remains unchanged.
2. MONETARY POLICY
In this section, I start by studying the implications of nontraded goods for the
nature of relative price differentials across countries under a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime. I then turn to the implications of the presence of nontraded goods
for the optimal response of monetary policy to country-speciﬁc shocks.
Relative Price Differentials
Under a ﬁxed nominal exchange rate regime, it follows from equation (24)
that home and foreign monetary stances, µ and µ∗, are proportional. That is,
µt = eµ∗
t , wheree istheﬁxedlevelofthenominalexchangerate.11 Theprice
level in the home country, Pt, is given by equation (26) while the price level
in the foreign country (expressed in foreign currency units), P ∗









































Note that when γ → 1 (that is, when agents do not consume local-
nontraded goods and consume the same basket of traded goods), the relative
price across countries is constant. This feature results from the fact that home
and foreign agents consume the exact same basket of goods, and the nominal
exchange rate is constant. Therefore, without nontraded goods, the model
cannot account for the observed relative price differentials across countries
when the nominal exchange rate is ﬁxed.12
In the presence of nontraded goods (γ<1), home and foreign agents
consumedistinctbasketsofgoods,andcountry-speciﬁcshocksleadtorelative
price differentials across countries (one period after the shock) under a ﬁxed
10 In the home country, for example, it follows from the pricing rules and demand functions













11 Note that a ﬁxed exchange rate regime can be interpreted as a monetary policy prescription
where home and foreign monetary policy stances are proportional. Later in this section, I will show
under which conditions such a prescription is optimal.
12 See, for example, Duarte (2003) for empirical evidence on relative price differentials across
countries in the European Union.M. Duarte: Monetary Policy and Country-Speciﬁc Shocks 31
exchange rate regime. With nontraded goods, the model is consistent with
observed relative price across countries when the exchange rate is ﬁxed.
Country-Speciﬁc Shocks
I now turn to the implications of the presence of nontraded goods for the opti-
mal response of monetary policy to country-speciﬁc shocks. I follow Corsetti
andPesenti(2001)andDevereuxandEngel(2003)andassumethatthemone-
taryauthorityineachcountrycommitstopreannouncedstate-contingentmon-
etary stances, {µ(sτ),µ ∗ (sτ)}∞
τ=t, chosen to maximize the (non-monetary)
expected utility of the country’s representative agent and taking the monetary
policy rule of the other country as given.13 That is, the monetary authority in








βτ−t (lnc(sτ) − l (sτ))
 
, (30)
taking{µ∗ (st+τ),z(st+τ),z ∗ (st+τ)}∞
τ=0 asgiven. ItisshownintheAppendix
C that the optimal monetary stances of the home and foreign monetary au-
thorities are given by
µt =











































Note ﬁrst that, in the absence of nontraded goods (that is, γ → 1), the
twomonetaryauthoritieschoosetorespondequallytocountry-speciﬁcshocks.
Therefore, when home and foreign agents consume exactly the same basket
of goods, the nominal exchange rate does not respond to country-speciﬁc pro-
ductivity shocks: a ﬁxed nominal exchange rate regime is consistent with the
optimal monetary policy rules. This result replicates the ﬁndings in Devereux
and Engel (2003) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001). Note, however, that as we
haveseen,inthiscasethemodelmissesonanimportantaspectoftheempirical
evidence by not implying relative price differentials across countries.
When agents consume local-nontraded goods (that is, γ<1), consump-
tion baskets differ across countries, and the rules above imply that the home
13As it is standard in the literature, I assume that governments ignore the utility from real
balances and consider optimal policies when χ → 0.32 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
and foreign monetary authorities choose to respond differently to country-
speciﬁc productivity shocks. Therefore, the nominal exchange rate responds
to country-speciﬁc productivity shocks (equation (24)) and a ﬁxed nominal
exchange rate regime is not consistent with the optimal monetary rules. Fur-
thermore, consistent with the evidence, if the two countries adopt a ﬁxed
exchange regime, the model implies relative price differentials across coun-
tries.
In response to a positive productivity shock in the home country (and
starting from a symmetric equilibrium), rules (31) and (32) require a larger
expansionary monetary policy (higher µ) in the home country than in the
foreign country when γ<1. These responses are associated with a depre-
ciation of the nominal exchange rate (equation (24)). As in the case with
ﬂexible prices, total consumption increases more in the home country than in
the foreign country in response to a positive real shock in the home country.
The terms of trade, however, are not affected by this shock (as they would be
if prices were ﬂexible) since prices are preset in the buyer’s currency. That
is, there is no consumption substitution toward goods produced in the home
country: consumption of all goods in a given country increases in the same
proportion.
In a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, identical responses by both home and
foreign monetary authorities cannot generate the distinct consumption paths
across countries associated with a country-speciﬁc shock. This result follows
from the fact that countries share a common nominal interest rate and prices
are preset. Therefore, the optimal responses by the monetary authorities,
which generate the distinct response of consumption across countries, require
independent monetary policies and, hence, an adjustable nominal exchange




In this article I develop a two-country general equilibrium model with traded
and nontraded goods where goods prices are set one period in advance in
the currency of the buyer. The monetary authority in each country follows a
state-contingent monetary policy rule that maximizes the expected utility of
the representative agent.
I show that the presence of nontraded goods has important implications
for the nature of price differentials across countries under a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime and for the optimal degree of nominal exchange rate variability in
response to country-speciﬁc shocks. When there are nontraded goods, agents
in different countries consume different baskets of goods and the optimal
monetary policy implies that the nominal exchange rate varies in responseM. Duarte: Monetary Policy and Country-Speciﬁc Shocks 33
to country-speciﬁc shocks. In contrast, when all goods are traded, agents
in different countries consume the same basket of goods, and the optimal
monetarypolicyimpliesthatthenominalexchangerateisconstantinresponse
to country-speciﬁc shocks.
The results in this article indicate the importance of observed price differ-
entials across countries in the evaluation of alternative exchange rate regimes.
The results indicate that the existence of nontraded goods imposes a welfare
cost to countries in a currency area that face country-speciﬁc shocks.
APPENDIX A: THE AGENT’S PROBLEM
Intratemporal problem
Given the consumption index (4), the utility-based price index PH is the price
















The equation for PH in (10) in the text is the solution to this problem. The
other price indexes are obtained from analogous problems.
To solve for the demand for individual variety h, consider the problem














c(h,j)PH (h)dh = XH.34 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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Note that by rearranging equation (33) we obtain
  1
0 c(h,j)PH (h)dh =
PHcH (j).
Following analogous derivations, we obtain









Combining these two expressions with equation (33) yields equation (11) in
the text. Equations (12) and (13) are obtained in a similar way.
Intertemporal problem
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Qst+1|stBst+1 (j) + Mt (j)
≤ Rt (j) + Bst (j) + Mt−1 (j) + Tt (j),
where revenues, Rt (j), and labor effort, lt (j), are given by
Rt (j) = PH,t (h)
  1
0





































= λt (j)Pt, (34)
χ
Mt (j)






λst (j)Qst+1|st = βπ(st+1|st)λst+1 (j), (36)
where π (st+1|st) is the conditional probability of event st+1,g i v e nst.
Recall that pricing decisions are made before the realization of period t
shocks. Therefore,theﬁrst-orderconditionswithrespecttoPH,t (h),P ∗
H,t (h),
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= 0. (39)36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Allagentswithinonecountrysolveidenticalproblemsandthereforemake
identical choices (even though they produce differentiated varieties of the
traded and nontraded goods). In a symmetric equilibrium in which all indi-
vidual variables are identical, it follows that aggregate quantities are equal
to per capita quantities (since the measure of agents is one in both coun-
tries) and that the price indexes PH,t, P ∗
H,t, and PN,t equal the price of its
varieties (PH,t (h), P ∗
H,t (h), and PN,t (n), respectively). That is, per capita
consumption of variety h in the home country is ct (h,i), ∀i, which is equal to
aggregate consumption of this variety: cH,t ≡
  1
0 ct (h,i)di = ct (h,i). Per
capita total consumption is ct (i), which is equal to aggregate total consump-
tion: ct ≡
  1
0 ct (i)di = ct (i). In what follows, I focus on the symmetric
equilibrium and therefore drop the index for the agent.






that the gross return 1 + it+1 is equal to the reciprocal of the price in period
t of a bond paying one unit of home currency in period t + 1 with certainty,





And from (40), it follows that
1
1 + it+1
















in a symmetric environment. Combining this expression with equation (41)
yields the money demand equation (18) in the text.
I now turn to the pricing equations (37) through (39). Note from equation
(11) that, in a symmetric equilibrium, expenditure in the composite good of
home-traded varieties is a constant share (given by ηγ) of total expenditure,
that is, PH,tcH,t = ηγPtct. Equation (37) can be simpliﬁed by making use of
equation (34) and this relationship between total expenditure and expenditure
in the composite good of home-traded varieties. Taking into account that













can be obtained in a similar fashion.M. Duarte: Monetary Policy and Country-Speciﬁc Shocks 37
The foreign agent solves a similar problem to the one of the home agent.
Note,however,thatsincebondsaredenominatedinhomecurrency,thebudget






































































0 = 1, which gives equation (24) in the text.
APPENDIX B: SOLUTION OF THE MODEL
To write real aggregate consumption as a function of real shocks (zt and z∗
t )
andmonetarystances(µt andµ∗
t ), notethat, inequilibrium, Ptct = µt. Using
equations (7) and (8), and the pricing equations (21) through (23), we can
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goods, it follows that labor effort in the home-traded and nontraded sectors















































Total labor effort is simply given by lt = lT,t + lN,t.
If, insteadofsettingpricesbeforetherealizationofuncertainty, producers
set prices after observing the current realization of productivity and monetary
stance shocks (ﬂexible prices) then, as noted in the text, the pricing equations
(21) through (23) hold in every state of the world and not only in expectation.
That is, with ﬂexible prices, the prices of nontraded goods and home-traded
goods at home and abroad are given by












The above expressions for aggregate consumption and total labor effort in the
home country simplify to equations (28) and (29) in the text.M. Duarte: Monetary Policy and Country-Speciﬁc Shocks 39
APPENDIX C: OPTIMAL POLICIES
Themonetaryauthorityineachcountrycommitstostate-contingentmonetary
stances µ(st) and µ∗ (st), chosen to maximize the (non-monetary) expected
utility of the country’s representative agent, taking the monetary policy rule








βτ−t (lnc(sτ) − l (sτ))
 
, (42)
taking {µ∗ (st+τ),z(st+τ),z ∗ (st+τ)}∞
τ=0 as given.










βτ−t (lnc(sτ) − l (sτ))
 
.
First, note that Et−1 [l (st)] = lfl(st). Second, note that, by using equation
(25),w eh a v e

















where a is a constant.
Theﬁrst-orderconditionofthemonetaryauthority’sproblemwithrespect
to µ(  st) is


























st π (st|st−1) = 1,
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which yields equation (31) in the text.40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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